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Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an increasingly important role in 
development assistance, but little systematic evidence is available about their objectives 
and choices in developing countries. This paper develops two stylized accounts of NGO 
motivation: one in which donor contracts determine location decisions, and another in 
which altruistic motivations are the principal determinants. The paper then uses data from 
the 1995 and 2000 rounds of the Bangladesh Household and Income and Expenditure 
Survey to analyze location decisions of NGO programs established between those two 
sample years. Whether disaggregated by sector of work or mother organization, the data 
show that the net change in NGO programs in a community was not related to indicators 
of community need, and that NGOs established new programs where they themselves had 
no programs previously, but that they were not concerned with duplicating the efforts of 
other NGOs. Overall, the analysis is consistent with an account of NGO motivation in 
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1.   Introduction 
Over the past twenty years there has been a dramatic shift in the provision of 
basic services in several developing countries. Services in health care, education, and 
rural credit, once largely the province of government ministries and other public entities, 
are increasingly being provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This is 
attributable, in part, to the increasing role of NGOs in development assistance. Whereas 
20 percent of World Bank–financed projects approved in 1989 included some NGO or 
community-based organization (CBO) involvement, that figure was 47 percent in 1997. 
A survey of World Bank projects approved between 1985 and 1997 found that the 
institution channeled $1.3 billion of development assistance through NGOs in seven 
countries alone (Gibbs, Fumo, and Kuby 1999). Even well-known skeptics of foreign aid 
are supportive of NGO work: Senator Helms has advocated raising the U.S. foreign aid 
budget provided that “charities” become the recipients (New York Times, January 12, 
2001). In the same article a USAID spokesman reported that 37 percent of the agency’s 
bilateral development assistance went through non-governmental groups.  
Yet, despite this widespread interest and a large number of case studies, there has 
been little systematic and quantitative analysis of NGOs active in developing countries, 
their objectives, and their choices.
1 This paper investigates location decision of NGO 
programs in Bangladesh. An understanding of this issue is important for both theoretical 
and practical reasons. First, identifying where NGOs go is important for poverty 
reduction. In designing their strategies, donors and developing country policymakers 
would like to know if NGOs actually target the poorest villages and neediest 
communities, as many claim to do. Second, a clearer understanding of location choice is 
important for developing an account of NGO incentives, which in turn could help donors 
and governments devise better contracts for motivating NGOs. Third, because an 
evaluation of the impact of public programs requires a prior account of location decisions 
in order to obtain unbiased estimates (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986; Pitt, Rosenzweig 
and Gibbons 1993), understanding the determinants of NGO location assists in evaluating 
the broader impact of NGO work.  
NGOs are non-profit organizations presumably guided by altruism. As a result, 
the forces that affect their location decisions might differ from those that influence firms 
or banks, which rely on an explicit evaluation of the present value of future returns and 
the costs of operating. A quick review of the stated objectives of two Bangladeshi NGOs 
in their brochures reveals this: “Grameen Bank provides credit to the poorest of the poor 
in rural Bangladesh without any collateral. At Grameen Bank, credit is a cost effective 
weapon to fight poverty and it serves as a catalyst in the overall socioeconomic 
development”; and “Poverty reduction programs undertaken so far have bypassed many 
                                                 
1. Case studies on NGOs in Bangladesh include Stiles (2002), Hadi (2000), Rahman (2002), and 
Matin and Taher (2001). The literature on not-for-profit organizations in rich countries is further 
developed. See, for instance, Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld (2001) and Glaeser (2003).    2
of the poorest. In this context one of BRAC's main focuses is the ultra poor. With 
multifaceted development interventions, BRAC strives to bring about changes in the 
quality of life of these people”.
2 Consequently, one would expect indicators of poverty or 
other measures of community well-being to have a considerable effect on the location 
decisions of these organizations. Indeed, if NGOs were purely altruistic, such factors 
would be the main determinants of these choices.  
Additional considerations, however, can affect NGO location decisions, perhaps 
predominantly so. Because NGOs, unlike firms and government agencies, obtain funds 
from external donors who presumably look for demonstrable results, their resources 
depend on how potential donors react to NGO success or failure.
3 The contract, explicit 
or implicit, between a donor and an NGO can affect the NGO’s incentives and location 
choices, and even create a conflict between the desire to reduce poverty and support 
socioeconomic development on the one hand, and the organizational imperative to secure 
funding on the other on the other. If NGO reputation is important to donors, as it appears 
to be (World Bank 1996), and if there are declining returns to reputation, then new and 
unknown new NGOs might undertake risky actions that, if successful, will prove their 
abilities; but well-established NGOs might prefer safe projects to avoid damaging their 
reputations. In some cases, the choice that maximizes the likelihood of receiving funds 
might not be socially optimal. For instance, if locating in an area in which other NGOs 
are already present reduces the ability of the NGO’s donor to determine whom to blame 
and whom to congratulate for development outcomes, and if as a result failure is not 
linked to a curtailment of funding from the donor, we might observe a tendency for 
several NGO programs to concentrate in the same location.
4 
As a heuristic device, we outline two accounts of NGO motivation: a so-called 
“opportunistic” one and a “benevolent” one. The first highlights the role of implicit 
contracts in the decisions of NGOs. If these organizations are interested in maximizing 
their funding, different types of contracts will have different effects on their decisions. 
The second highlights the desire of NGOs to do the right thing, that is, to reduce poverty 
and improve the conditions of the most unfortunate, regardless of the effect that their 
actions have on funding flows. Of course, for most NGOs both forces are probably at 
                                                 
2. These descriptions are taken from http://www.grameen-info.org and http://www.brac.net. The 
management of Grameen Bank frequently points out that it is not legally an NGO: unlike other NGOs, 
which are incorporated under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 or the Companies Act of 1994, the 
Grameen Bank has separate incorporating legislation, the Grameen Bank Ordinance of 1983, which granted 
it specific benefits and exemptions. Nevertheless, the activities of Grameen Bank resemble those of several 
other NGOs, and the Household Income and Expenditure Surveys of 1995 and 2000, from which data for 
this paper are taken, includes Grameen Bank in the list of specific “NGOs” it enumerates in each 
community.  
3. At least in principle the government can increase revenues by raising taxes. Annual reports revealed 
that for the year 2002, BRAC’s reliance on donor funding was 22 percent, Proshika 25 per cent, and Caritas 
80 percent. 
4. Easterly (2002) argues for the existence of this “blame sharing effect” in the work and choices of 
aid agencies.   3
play. In other words, NGOs might be benevolent and pragmatic: they might choose to 
locate in some poor areas, but not in poor areas primarily, because in the latter case the 
risk of a failure is so high that it could jeopardize the flow of funding from donors. 
Using data from the 1995 and 2000 Household Income and Expenditure Surveys 
(HIES) and the Community Information Schedule of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
(BBS), we estimate the determinants of location decisions for NGO programs in 
Bangladesh. The objective of the analysis is to assess whether NGOs were mainly 
targeting poorer areas, or whether the need to signal their achievements to donors 
significantly influenced their location choices. Our paper is closely related to Zeller and 
others (2001), who use thana-level data from the 1994 Statistical Yearbook of 
Bangladesh to identify the determinants of branch placement for group-based lending 
institutions, particularly BRAC, ASA and Proshika. They conduct their analysis at the 
thana, or subdistrict level, and use cross-sectional regressions without addressing the 
endogeneity of placement choices. In our paper, we use a narrower unit of observation, 
the community, and we exploit time series information to account for location decisions.
5 
Also related is Ravallion and Wodon (2000), who use cross-sectional data from the 
earlier round (1991–1992) of the Bangladesh Household Expenditure Survey (HES) and 
data on bank branch locations. They argue that the geographic placement of banks should 
be influenced by the potential gain from switching to more profitable non-farm activities 
in rural areas, estimate the potential gains from such switching, and find that Grameen 
chooses bank locations so that more of those gains are realized by the poor, whereas other 
banks are located in areas in which the gains favor groups other than the poor.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 characterizes the different views of 
NGOs in the development literature and the context in which Bangladeshi NGOs operate. 
Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 formulates two 
alternative models that can describe NGO behavior. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
findings in light of the empirical predictions derived in the previous section. Section 6 
concludes. 
2.  Perceptions of NGOs and Country Context 
Varying perceptions 
Perceptions of non-governmental organizations in development are mixed. On the 
one hand, some believe that they are flexible, innovative, and efficient vehicles for the 
delivery of basic services and for poverty alleviation, that they reach poor communities 
and remote areas at lower cost than governments, that they identify genuine local needs, 
and that they promote participation and transfer appropriate technologies―they are the 
“magic bullets” of development (Vivian 1994). On the other hand, others have argued 
that most NGOs are started and controlled by charismatic individuals who necessarily 
limit participatory decisionmaking (Wood 1997), and that any evidence of NGO 
                                                 
5. In the year 2000, there were 496 thanas in Bangladesh, with an average population of 230,000; but 
there 64,000 villages, with an average population of about 1,800.   4
effectiveness remains weak (Edwards and Hulme 1995). In South Asia, for instance, the 
Grameen Bank has built a worldwide reputation for its work and now offers development 
advice and consulting services to a number of other countries. It claims that its credit 
programs for poor rural women in Bangladesh attain repayment rates consistently over 90 
per cent (Khandker, Khalily and Khan 1996) and that they are entirely self-financed.
6 At 
the same time there are stories of opportunism and corruption, including that of a 
Pakistani wit who said that while dowries once consisted of cash and livestock, now they 
include cash, livestock, and an NGO (Smillie and Hailey 2001). 
There are two main reasons why perceptions of NGOs differ so. Most obviously, 
the term encompasses a variety of different organizations. NGOs vary in size and scope, 
religious orientation, their use of volunteers or professionals, and their relationships to 
governments and donors. The same NGO, moreover, can evolve substantially over its 
lifetime. Characterizations of the life of a typical NGO generally describe an evolution 
from volunteerism, political activity, “conscientization,” and small-scale pilots toward 
professional staff, expansion in size and scale, report-writing and evaluation, contracting 
with donors and government, and involvement in profit-generating activities 
(Sooryamoorthy and Gangrade 2001; Wood 1997). At different times, the same NGO can 
appear to be both original and foreign-directed, selfless and self-promoting, haphazard 
and efficient, giving credence to various charges of hypocrisy or “selling out.” 
The second reason that judgments of NGOs tend to be polarized is that NGOs are 
usually defined in relation to what they are not. Unlike government, NGOs are supposed 
to be innovative and to respond flexibly to their clients; unlike firms, NGOs are supposed 
to prioritize the poor and to serve public, rather than private, purposes. The problem with 
these negative definitions is that the same economic, social, and political pressures that 
influence public sector and firm behavior eventually affect NGOs. Particularly as they 
scale up, NGOs inevitably share characteristics of the very entities in opposition to which 
they are defined. For example, some of the prominent NGOs in Bangladesh arose during 
the Liberation struggle in the early 1970s, when self-interest was set aside for national 
reconstruction, and gained further prominence in relief efforts following disastrous floods 
in 1988 and the cyclone in 1991, times when human needs were obvious and not 
significantly contested. But after the emergency receded, the NGOs resumed conducting 
the day-to-day task of helping to articulate and respond to community demands in the 
traditional Bangladeshi manner—by prioritizing personal relationships, bestowing 
largesse in the form of access or favors, playing the role of “officer” to rural folk (White 
1999). It would have been surprising had NGOs been able to escape the patron-client 
model that also limits the capacity of government both to represent and serve citizens’ 
needs. To take another example, Sahaya Sadanam, a rural development NGO in India, 
began as a popular community development association led by a rustic villager with 
strong Gandhian ideals. As it grew in size and complexity, the founder brought on first 
                                                 
6. For evaluations of Grameen Bank and other micro-finance lenders, see Wall Street Journal, Nov 
27, 2001; Morduch (1999a, 1999b, 2000).   5
his wife, then his daughters, a brother, and a son-in-law, to help run the organization 
because he spent more time away fund-raising. Villagers believed that both the family’s 
and the NGO’s expenditures grew lavish, and the NGO resisted an attempt by a local 
Marxist party to unionize its staff (Sooryamoorthy and Gangrade 2001). Although 
outrageous to some of those directly involved, from a distance it is not surprising that 
pressure to employ kin, which afflicts many if not most firms in India, would also affect 
this private entity. The incongruity stems from the belief that NGOs are supposed to 
serve public, and never private, objectives. 
The country context 
Bangladesh makes a good case study because NGOs are unusually concentrated 
and influential in that country.
7 Their influence in Bangladesh dates to the civil war that 
led to the nation’s independence, in which one million people died and ten million others 
were displaced, as well as to the disastrous cyclones of 1972, which overwhelmed the 
capacities of the newly established government in Dhaka. The international agencies and 
Northern NGOs that offered the government assistance also funded a number of local 
voluntary organizations that sprung up to help in the reconstruction effort. As conditions 
became more stable, many of these NGOs expanded their activities to include not only 
disaster relief, but poverty alleviation more broadly, as well as “consciousness raising,” 
(Hashemi 1996). Donors continued to send resources because the needs were obvious, the 
absence of ideological or federal divisions in government reduced potential rivals, and a 
religiously and ethnically homogenous society was receptive (Smillie and Hailey 2001). 
These initial conditions set the stage for the rapid expansion of Bangladeshi NGOs in the 
coming years. 
Over the last decade foreign donors have increased the share of their support that 
is channeled through Bangladeshi NGOs. The official funds available to the NGOs went 
from about 8 percent of overseas development assistance in 1991–1992 to 14 percent in 
1994–1995 (Holloway 1998 and World Bank 1996). Some of the more prominent NGOs, 
such as BRAC and Proshika, have negotiated $50 million assistance packages with 
foreign donors (Hulme and Edwards 1997). NGOs of varying types, including 
community organizations, membership organizations, private voluntary development 
groups, and religious institutions, are involved in a sizeable fraction of development 
activity in the country. In education, for instance, community managed schools educate 
40 percent of enrolled students at the primary level and 97 percent at the secondary level 
(World Bank 1998). The credit activities of Grameen Bank alone reach over 2 million 
borrowers, and NGOs as a whole account for 65 per cent of all rural credit in the country 
(Holcombe 1995; World Bank 1996). The achievements of some of the NGOs are also 
                                                 
7. In March, 2003, as part of a broader study of NGOs in Bangladesh, the authors conducted an 
enumeration of NGOs in the country. The enumeration included all NGOs officially registered with the 
NGO Affairs Bureau in Dhaka in addition to the registered field offices of Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, 
Proshika, and Caritas. That exercise resulted in a list of 7,643 NGOs in Bangladesh. Field enumeration was 
also conducted in 35 sample thanas. In those thanas, the number of NGOs based on field enumeration 
exceeded the number in the administrative list by 21 percent.    6
striking, particularly in comparison to the government. BRAC, for instance, reportedly 
had attendance rates of 90 percent in its non-formal primary schools while the 
corresponding attendance rate for government schools was 15 per cent (Holloway 1998).  
3.  Data and a Description of NGO Location in Bangladesh 
Data 
The data used in the analysis are taken from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) of 1995–96 and of 2000. In rural 
areas, which accounted for 80 percent of the population in 1998, the HIES included both 
household and community questionnaires, and it is the latter that inquired about the 
number and types of NGO programs in the sampled rural communities. A total of 252 
communities were sampled in each survey. For 248 of them we have observations in both 
surveys, which allows for the creation of a panel data set. Missing values for the selected 
variables reduced the sample size about 20 percent in each of the regressions estimated.
8 
Up to three NGO programs could be listed in the 1995–96 survey, and up to ten in the 
2000 survey. Although the difference in the number of allowable listings might bias the 
analysis, only 26 communities (10 percent) in 1995–96 used all three allowed slots for 
NGO programs, suggesting that the problem of truncation is not large. We also use data 
on the number of votes received in each constituency by the winner and the runner-up, as 
well as their political affiliations, in the Seventh Parliamentary Elections. 
The 1995–96 questionnaire asked if the NGO program in question belonged to 
one of four major NGOs (Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika, and Caritas), and the 2000 
questionnaire also inquired about a fifth specific NGO, ASA. In order to analyze the 
behavioral characteristics of distinct types of NGOs, if an NGO program was named as 
one of the four identified in the 1995–96 questionnaire, it was called a “Brand NGO”; 
otherwise it was “Other NGO.” (ASA programs were not included in either category 
because they would be have to be placed in different categories in the two sample years.) 
Both questionnaires also asked for the type of activity conducted in each NGO program, 
with choices that included credit, education, skills training, health and family planning, 
tree planting, water and sanitation, and other. There were small differences between the 
two questionnaires regarding the language used to characterize these activities, but they 
did not appear to be substantial enough to lead the same NGO program to be 
characterized differently in the two surveys.  
A variable for the number of government programs was constructed by simply 
adding extant government programs, from a list of ten, reported in each community. A 
measure of the remoteness of the community was constructed by adding the reported 
travel time from the community to both the thana and the district headquarters. 
Community-level estimates for poverty and literacy were constructed by matching the 
household and community questionnaires. Household data, along with regional and 
                                                 
8. There were weak correlations between missing values and the variables of interest, suggesting that 
the missing values are not biasing the estimation results.   7
temporal deflators, were used to construct several measures of poverty. In constructing 
the poverty indicators we mainly used the lower poverty line that indicates the very poor, 
but also checked the results with indicators derived from the upper poverty line. A 
measure of local political influence was constructed by adding one point to a score if a 
member, the secretary, or the chair of the local thana council resided in the community, 
resulting in a score for political influence that ranged from zero to three. In order to 
control for the role of political factors in NGO location decisions we used data from the 
1996 elections to construct a variable for the ratio of votes received by the winner and the 
runner-up, as well as an indicator variable equal to one if the party winning in the local 
constituency was the same as the party that won nationally.
9  
 Description of NGO location in Bangladesh 
Table 1 reports the percentage of communities with at least one NGO program 
and the average number of programs per community. It shows that there was a marked 
increase in both the intensity and coverage of development NGOs in Bangladesh in the 
late 1990s, with increases visible across organizations and sectors of activity. The 
percentage of rural Bangladeshi communities with at least one NGO programs went from 
48 percent in 1995–96 to 91 percent in 2000. For Brand NGOs, the coverage rate more 
than doubled, going from 39 to 84 percent; for Other NGOs it nearly tripled, going from 
18 to 48 percent. The intensity of NGO programs within communities also increased: for 
all NGOs the average number of programs in 1995–96 was 0.9; in 2000 it was 2.8. The 
share of those programs that Brand NGOs operated declined from 71 to 63 percent: 
although Brand NGOs continued to predominate, the number of Other NGOs grew faster 
over the period.  
Credit and education programs drastically increased their presence across and 
within communities. BRAC and Grameen were the NGOs with the widest scale of 
operations: in 2000 each was present in more than half the rural communities in the 
country, and BRAC was approaching an average of nearly one program per rural 
community.  
Tables 2 and 3 characterize the type of activities that NGOs were performing in 
the sampled communities. In 1995 BRAC was engaged primarily in education programs 
and only secondarily in credit and health/family planning, but by 2000 the number of 
BRAC credit programs had increased sevenfold and was larger than the number of its 
education programs, which themselves had more than doubled.  
                                                 
9. These election results can be found at http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/bd_elections_const.html. 
Two rival political parties dominate Bangladeshi politics, and most civil society organizations, including 
many development NGOs, are allied with one or the other. The variables for political party were used in 
this analysis only to control for the role of political alliances in NGO location decisions and were not the 
main focus of the inquiry. While some political variables were significant in the estimations below, 
excluding them did not change the findings in any substantial way.    8
 
Table 2. NGO and type of activity performed, 1995–1996 sample 
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Table 3. NGO and type of activity performed, 2000 sample 
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Table 1. Distribution of NGO and Government Programs in Rural Bangladesh, 1995–96 
and 2000 
Communities with NGO Program  Average number of NGO Programs    



































































































































Note: standard errors in parenthesis.   9
BRAC and Other NGOs were responsible for almost all of the increase in NGO 
education programs. The increases in Other NGO programs were also concentrated in the 
credit sector. The number of BRAC health/family planning programs doubled; by the 
year 2000 they represented a little more than 10 percent of all BRAC programs. 
Interestingly, the share of programs managed by Other NGOs increased in every sector, 
suggesting growing diversification in NGO providers.  
It is clear that the presence and intensity of NGOs at the community level 
increased on average over the five-year period, but it is not evident from the tables above 
whether NGOs preferred to locate new programs in communities that already had NGO 
programs or whether they sought out underserved areas. Table 4 compares, for 
communities that did and did not have NGO programs in 1995, the average number of 
programs in the year 2000. In almost every category, by 2000 communities that did not 
have an NGO program in 1995 had virtually caught up with communities that did have at 
least one program in 1995, indicating that NGOs tended to locate new programs in 
previously neglected communities. For some categories (Caritas, credit, and skills 
training), concentrations in communities that were not served by NGOs in 1995 had by 
2000 in fact exceeded concentrations in communities with programs in 1995. On average, 
communities that had no NGOs in 1995 had 2.72 NGO programs in 2000, more than the 
1995 average among communities with programs, which was 1.9.  
 
Table 4. Average number of programs in 2000 by type and NGO 
  Communities with at least one NGO 
program in 1995 
Communities with no NGO programs in 
1995 


































































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. For communities that had NGO programs in 1995, the average number in 1995 is in 
brackets.   10
Table 5 addresses a slightly different set of questions: when NGOs made program 
placement decisions between 1995 and 2000, did they prefer communities where they 
already had programs or did they avoid those communities? For every NGO program 
brand and type in column 1 of the table,
10 column two lists the net change in programs 
per community among communities that had at least one NGO program of that brand or 
type in 1995, and column two lists the net change in communities that had no programs 
of that brand or type in 1995. In the first column of the table, almost every value is 
negative; and in the second column, every value is positive. That means that in most 
cases, NGOs reduced program intensity in communities where they were operating and 
increased program intensity in communities where they were not operating. The major 
exception involves credit programs, which increased in intensity in communities where 
                                                 
10. As terms of art, we use NGO “brand” to refer to the owner of the NGO program irrespective of 
the sector in which it operates (brands are Grameen, BRAC, Proshika, Caritas, which each have separate 
ownership and governance; and small, which is an agglomeration of all other NGOs); and we use NGO 
“type” to refer to the different sectors of NGO program activity irrespective of ownership (types are credit, 
education, etc.).  
Table 5. Average change in the number of programs 
Program X 
Communities with at least  
one program X in 1995 
Communities  
without program X in 1995 












































































(0.36)   11
they were present in 1995 (though not as much as they did in communities where they 
were not present). Because, as shown in tables 2 and 3, credit programs are so widespread 
in the country (59 percent of NGO programs in the sample focus on credit), the positive 
value on credit in column 1 is the dominant effect, with the result that communities with 
at least one NGO program in 1995 increased their number of programs by 1.16 in 2000 
even though all of the other values (apart from credit) are negative. A similar pattern is 
evident in the location of new government programs: communities that did not have a 
government program in 1995 experienced a greater increase, although the difference was 
not nearly as large as with NGO programs. 
To summarize the discussion so far, there are two distinct (though possibly 
related) findings. First, table 4 shows that every type and brand of NGO increased its 
presence more in communities that had no NGO programs in 1995 than in communities 
that already had programs. Why? Perhaps those communities that had no NGO programs 
in 1995 were poorer or more remote, and NGOs increased efforts to reach needy 
communities over the period; or perhaps donors rewarded NGOs who went to neglected 
communities, and the NGOs sought to distinguish themselves by going where other 
NGOs were not operating. Second, table 5 shows that between 1995 and 2000, every 
NGO brand and type (with the exception of credit programs) reduced coverage in 
communities in which it was already operating, and increased programs in communities 
where it was not operating. Again, two kinds of explanation are possible. Perhaps each 
NGO shifted its focus to regions it had neglected, and did so by shifting resources from 
areas that were well covered (except credit programs, which increased coverage 
everywhere); or perhaps donors rewarded NGOs that reduced duplication of efforts and 
established programs in new areas. The estimations below test these two accounts by 
examining whether indicators of community well-being were related to changes in NGO 
program intensity between 1995 and 2000. It is important, here, however, to rule out one 
another potential explanation for the changes in program coverage: as table 6 shows, 
NGOs were not moving to a particular region of the country. All five divisions 
experienced similar increases in NGO program coverage and intensity during this period. 
Along with table 1, the table also documents the spatial variation of NGO concentration 
across the country, variation that we exploit in this analysis of NGO location. Before 
turning to the estimations, however, the next section sharpens our account of NGO 
motivation with two simple models of behavior.  
4. Alternative  Accounts of NGO Motivation 
This section develops two simple and highly stylized models of how NGOs might 
decide where to locate a new program. The models characterize two forms of extreme 
behavior on the part of NGOs: purely opportunistic and purely benevolent. The section 
shows how these two kinds of NGOs choose their locations in accordance with their 
different incentives. Predictions from these stylized models are later used to interpret our 
empirical results. 
   12
The opportunistic approach 
Suppose that there are two villages, A and B, and two NGOs, N1 and N2. In 
village A there is a program run by N1, in village B none. N2 wants to start a program and 
has to decide whether to go to village A or B. Let p be the probability of success and (1–
p) the probability of failure, where p is a measure of the ability of the NGO. Assume that 
the NGOs depend on outside funding. The donor looks at the performance of the NGO 
and decides whether to give it money and how much. The contract specifies a payment of 
x in case of success and y in case of failure, where x > y. When there is a unique NGO 
acting in a village, then the donor can determine the contribution of the NGO towards the 
outcome; however, if there are several NGOs then the donor cannot assess the 
contribution of each to the outcome, in which case, for simplicity, we assume the donor 
gives a lump sum payment z independent of the actual outcome, where x>z>y. 
Given this contract, the expected utility to the NGO from acting alone is 
U(alone)=pu(x)+(1–p)u(y). 
If instead the NGO goes to a community where there is already another NGO then its 
expected utility is  
U(joint)=u(z). 
The entering NGO will choose to start the program in the village without one, if the 
following condition holds: 
U(alone)> U(joint); 
that is,  
Table 6. Average presence and number of programs by NGO in the 5 Divisions 
  Average Number of NGOs  Presence of NGOs 


















































Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.   13
u(x)–u(y)>[u(z)–u(y)]/p,    (1) 
which tells us that the NGOs that decide to go alone are the ones with an ability such that 
 p* > [u(z)–u(y)]/[u(x)–u(y)].    (2) 
The rate of change in this ability cutoff with respect to the rate of change the contract 
(reward level) is: 
dp*/dx=[(u(y)–u(0))/(u(x)–u(y))^2]*u’(x) < 0; 
that is, the cutoff point decreases as the reward increases. That means that as the contract 
becomes more “positive,” the expected level of talented needed to work alone is lower. 
Also, we have 
dp*/dy=[(u(0)–u(x))/(u(x)–u(y)) ^2]*u’(y) < 0, 
which implies that as the punishment gets harsher (y decreases), the cut off in ability goes 
up: the likelihood of success has to increase if the NGO is to act alone.  
Two extreme cases help to clarify the model. Suppose that we have a contract in 
which the agent is rewarded in the event of a positive outcome, but is not punished in the 
event of a negative one. This means that y = z. Then condition (1) reduces to:  
u(x)>u(y), 
which is always true by definition. Hence, in the case where there is no punishment for a 
negative outcome, all agents have an incentive to take risky action and start a program 
where others are not active. On the other hand if x = z (there is no reward for a positive 
outcome), then  
u(y)>u(z), 
which is never true. Hence, if there is only punishment in the event of a negative outcome 
and no reward in for a positive outcome, all entrant NGOs would start programs in 
communities that already had them. More generally, equation (2) shows that the higher 
(lower) the reward for success, represented by x, relative to the punishment from failure, 
represented by y, the more (less) likely an NGO is to go alone.  
This simple example shows that contract specification can affect the location 
decisions of NGOs. All NGOs, to the extent they behave opportunistically, will exhibit 
some tendency to act alone if they are rewarded for their achievements. The model also 
suggests that donor dependence might affect NGO choices. Less established NGOs, 
which are in search of but do not have much donor financing that are less dependent on 
donors, and that face less downside risk to their reputations than established NGOs, will 
have more of an incentive to distinguish themselves by going into a village where their 
work is more easily observed by donors.    14
Although it is not formally modeled here, it is easy to imagine how limits on 
information in contracts between donors and NGOs might further affect location choices. 
The suggestion is consistent with the idea that principal-agent contracts are suboptimal 
when outcomes are unobservable (or difficult to measure), and that as a result agents 
skew their efforts towards low return, observable outputs and away from high return, 
unobservable ones. Here donor dependence might push NGOs to expand their coverage 
as much as possible if donors do not observe actual outcomes (since they are difficult to 
measure) and instead use other indicators of effort, such as widespread presence on the 
territory or “coverage,” to evaluate NGOs. In that case, opportunistic NGOs will locate 
new programs in regions where they were not located in the previous time period, but 
they will be less sensitive to the number of other NGOs in the communities in which they 
locate and insensitive to poverty levels.  
The benevolent approach 
A benevolent approach emphasizes that NGOs will locate in communities in 
which they can maximize their impact; where, in other words, in which the marginal 
product of their programs are highest. To accomplish that, in addition to locating on the 
basis of village characteristics, NGOs will take into account possible interactions with 
existing organizations. In particular, NGOs will in choosing a village incorporate 
information on whether existing programs are complementary to or substitutes for its own 
programs.  
Suppose that the change in poverty or in any other outcome of interest were to 
depend on the initial level of poverty, p, and the number of programs in the village. A 
benevolent NGO will set the number of its own programs in a community to maximize 
the desired outcome (poverty reduction, for example). The problem for NGO i is to: 
choose ni to max y=f(p, ni, n-i). 
where y represents poverty reduction or another outcome of interest, ni is the number of 
programs of NGO i in the village, n-i is the number of programs by other NGOs, and p is 
the existing level of poverty. The optimal number of programs in a village for an NGO 
will then depend on the interaction between its own programs and the existing programs 
of other NGOs, for a given level of poverty. If fn-i, ni > 0 then programs of other NGOs are 
complementary to its own, and, for a given level of poverty, the more programs of other 
NGOs already in the village, the more programs that NGO i will want to place in the 
community. On the other hand, if other types of programs are substitutes, then one would 
expect to see the existence of other types of NGO programs to be negatively related to the 
likelihood of the NGO to place a new program in the village. Again, these results hold for 
a given level of poverty: other factors being equal, a benevolent NGO would go to a 
community with a higher level of poverty, where its marginal product is likely higher. On 
this line of thinking, what really matters for NGO location is whether two programs are 
substitutes or complements, irrespective of who owns the programs. For illustration, it 
seems reasonable to think that an NGO will not want to start a credit program in a   15
community in which there are other credit programs in place since the marginal effect of 
an extra one, ceteris paribus, is small. Rather, it might prefer to start the credit program 
where there is an existing education program if education programs combined with credit 
programs are the best formula for bringing people out of poverty.  
Table 7 summarizes the discussion above. For both models of NGO behavior, it 
lists the predicted signs on right-hand side variables in an estimation in which the left-
hand side variable is the change in the number of NGOs in a given community. For all 
NGO programs, the opportunistic model predicts a negative sign on number of NGO 
programs in 1995 (because NGOs will go to neglected areas in order to distinguish 
themselves in the eyes of donors), as does the benevolent account (because NGOs will 
seek out underserved communities). The key difference is on the sign of coefficients for 
the poverty and well being variables. For Other NGO programs, which are less well 
established than Brand NGOs, both models again predict negative signs for number of 
NGO programs; but there might evidence that Other NGOs are more likely to go to 
communities that have few programs (in order to distinguish themselves in the eyes of 
donors). Also, a critical difference will again involve the variables for poverty and well-
being. For the estimations involving NGO brands, the key difference between the models 
(in addition to poverty and well-being) is that in the benevolent model NGOs should not 
distinguish between the existence of their own and other NGO programs, avoiding both 
alike in order to reach underserved communities; but under the opportunistic model the 
coefficient on others’ programs will be not be significant (because NGOs want to show 
donors how wide the coverage of their own programs is, irrespective of what others are 
doing, or because the bigger NGOs, to whom the brand labels apply, have little incentive 
to distinguish themselves by going into communities where there are no other programs). 
Finally, in the estimations involving NGO types, the benevolent model is indeterminate 
on the sign for programs of other types, depending on whether they are complements or 
substitutes, and the opportunistic model predicts an indeterminate (depending on whether 
NGOs want to distinguish themselves by going alone) or not significant (if NGOs are 
only interested in the coverage of their own programs irrespective of whether there are 
other programs in communities) sign. The key difference again involves poverty and 
well-being. The empirical section below tests these accounts of NGO program location 
under the two different accounts of NGO motivation.    16
5.  Empirical Specification and Main Findings 
Specification  
Our estimates of the determinants of NGO program location are based on the 
following regression model: 
Nijt+5 – Nijt= β0 + β1Nijt + β2Ni(-j)t + β3Yit +ΣkβkWikt + ΣhβhXit + µg+εijt+5 
where Nijt is the per capita number of programs j in community i in year t; Ni(-j)t is the 
number of per capita NGO programs excluding those of type j in community i in year t, 
Wit is a vector of community characteristics in year t in community i (remoteness, 
number of government programs, literacy, population, political variables), X is a set of 
measures of poverty or need in the community (log of per capita consumption, poverty 
gap, agricultural wage for males) and µg represents a geographical-level
11 fixed effect that 
captures omitted or unobservable location-specific factors. The variables for number of 
programs are estimated in per capita terms because, in both opportunistic and benevolent 
accounts, NGOs should be concerned with community population size in deciding where 
to locate. The per capita numbers also normalize the variables, allowing for greater 
variation and more precise estimates. The substantive results do not change if absolute 
numbers of programs instead. Note also that the left-hand side variable is the change in 
                                                 
11. There are 8 different geographical areas in which Bangladesh has been divided. 
Table 7. Predicted sign, magnitude, and significance of determinants of program location 
under different models of NGO behavior 
Variable (in 1995)  Opportunistic model  Benevolent model 
All NGO Programs    
•  Number of NGO 
programs 
 negative  negative 
•  Poverty and well-being   not significant  positive 
Other NGO programs    





•  Poverty and well-being   not significant  positive 
NGO brands (BRAC, etc.)     





•  Number of others’ 
programs 
not significant or negative  negative 
•  Poverty and well-being   not significant  positive 
NGO types (credit, etc.)     





•  Number of programs of 
other types 
not significant or indeterminate 
 
indeterminate 
•  Poverty and well-being   not significant  positive   17
the number of programs in each community, which is a result of both entry and exit 
decisions on the part of NGOs. We interpret entry and exit decisions in the same light – 
both reflect the NGOs’ choices on where to prioritize program strength. We estimate the 
regression by standard ordinary least squares.
12  
The results below are interpreted in light of the benevolent and opportunistic 
accounts of NGO motivation. In particular, a negative coefficient on “own” programs and 
on “other” programs would suggest a benevolent NGO that simply locates in 
communities without existing programs. Under a benevolent account of NGO behavior, 
one would also expect to find positive and significant coefficients on indicators of need.  
Main findings  
Table 8 shows the results for changes between 1995 and 2000 in the per capita 
number of programs run by any NGO, by Brand NGOs, and by Other NGOs. In all three 
regressions, the coefficients on the per capita number of NGO programs of the same kind 
extant in 1995 were significant and negative. This indicates a dispersion effect: NGOs of 
all sizes entered areas in which they were not present and/or left communities in which 
they were already working. This is consistent with both the opportunistic account (if 
donors rewarded broader coverage) and the benevolent account (if NGOs were moving to 
under-served areas) of NGO motivation. But indicators of community well-being, 
including poverty, had no effect on program location in any of the regressions, suggesting 
that aggregate poverty levels were not a significant factor in NGO program location 
decisions. (Perhaps NGOs were targeting the poorest individuals within the selected 
communities, but the available data could not test that possibility.) Brand and Other 
NGOs differed in one area. The regressions showed that Brand NGO programs were 
moving to the same places as new government programs, and that Other NGO programs 
were not. Brand NGOs, in other words, were not substituting for government programs 
but instead following them.  
While these results pooled several kinds of programs and organizations, table 9 
presents results from regressions that disaggregate NGOs by type, and table 10 presents 
results that disaggregate by brand, in order to analyze the choices of different program 
types and brands, which might be influenced by different factors. In table 9, which 
analyzes six types of programs—credit, education, health/family planning, skill training, 
water supply and tree plantation—the coefficients on the per capita number of programs 
of the same type in 1995 were always highly significant and negative. At the same time, 
none of the coefficients on the numbers of NGO programs of other types were 
significant. This result, as table 7 above shows, is consistent with both opportunistic and 
benevolent behavior. One might argue, on the other hand, that these results are driven by 
neither opportunistic nor benevolent behavior but merely by programmatic necessities: 
                                                 
12. To mitigate problems related to unobserved village specific effects, we ran regressions in which 
we controlled for the religious composition of the population, types of earning activities, quality of the 
roads, electrification of the village, existence of telephones, and sources of drinking water. In no case did 
the substantive results change.    18
NGOs open programs in a village, create local know-how, and then move to other 
villages. But while this explanation might be relevant to NGO programs dedicated to 
limited projects, such as water supply and tree plantation, it is less plausible for sectors 
where community needs are more long-term, such as credit, education, and health/family 
planning. Indicators of poverty and community well-being were not significant for credit 
and education programs, and were actually negative and significant for skills training 
programs. There was some evidence for the benevolent account in the regressions – the 
coefficients on percentage of landless were significant at 10 percent for water supply and 
tree plantation programs, and the coefficient on per capita consumption was significant at 
10 percent for health/family planning programs—but in general the findings were more 
somewhat more consistent with the opportunistic account.  
Table 8. NGOs and government programs 
  NGO    Brand NGOs    Other NGOs  
           
PC number of NGO programs in 1995  –0.821  ***        
 (0.170)          
PC number of government programs  0.162  **  0.128  **  0.031   
 (0.081)    (0.053)    (0.040)   
PC number of Other programs      –0.092    –1.245  ***
     (0.333)    (0.177)   
PC number of Brand programs      –0.656  ***  –0.017   
     (0.126)    (0.104)   
Poverty –1.340    –0.352    –0.342   
 (1.591)    (1.004)    (0.625)   
Cost –0.020    –0.023    –0.022   
 (0.043)    (0.025)    (0.025)   
Per capita consumption  –0.125    –0.001    –0.080   
 (0.403)    (0.278)    (0.135)   
Percentage of landless  0.091    0.142    0.207   
 (0.380)    (0.234)    (0.169)   
Literacy –0.001    –0.002    –0.003  * 
 (0.004)    (0.003)    (0.002)   
Constant 1.878    0.553    0.783   
 (2.689)    (1.800)    (0.922)   
Political Control  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Geographical Fixed Effect  Yes    Yes    Yes   
N 206    205    205   
R squared  0.302    0.280    0.316     19
 
Whereas a negative coefficient on the per capita number of own programs and an 
insignificant coefficient on the number of other kinds of programs is consistent with the 
benevolent account in estimates for NGO types, it is not consistent with the benevolent 
account in estimates for NGO brand. In other words, if NGOs were purely benevolent, 
they would treat the presence of programs of other NGOs in the same way they treated 
their own: one would expect the coefficients β1 and β2 to be the same. Table 10 shows 
that the coefficients are not the same. The coefficients on the per capita number of own 
programs in 1995 were always negative and highly significant, suggesting that NGOs 
preferred to locate their programs in communities where they were not present; but the 
coefficients on per capita number of other NGO programs were never significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that NGOs were not concerned whether other NGO 
brands were already operating in a given area. This finding is consistent with the 
opportunistic account of NGO behavior in which NGOs spread out to new regions 
because donors use coverage as an indictor of NGO effort. A proponent of the benevolent 
model might reply that perhaps there is a higher degree of substitutability between 
programs of the same type, and the different NGO brands basically offer programs of just 
one type. As tables 2 and 3 show, that might be true for Grameen Bank, whose programs 
are predominantly in credit, but not for the other NGOs, which operate a variety of 
different types of programs. Table 10 also shows that the coefficients on poverty were not 
Table 9. Results by type of program 
   Credit    Education   
Family 
planning   
Skill 
training   
Water 
supply    
Tree 
plantation   
                   
PC number of same type of program in 1995 –0.954 *** –0.638  *** –0.869 *** –1.077 *** –1.032 ***  –0.998  ***
 (0.290)  (0.150)    (0.162)   (0.036)   (0.144)  (0.039)   
PC number of other programs in1995  0.012  0.041    0.026    –0.024   0.002   0.000   
 (0.166)  (0.058)    (0.052)   (0.022)   (0.023)  (0.000)   
PC number of government programs  0.158 ** –0.029  *  0.021    0.005    0.008    0.000   
 (0.069)  (0.020)    (0.026)   (0.012)   (0.012)  (0.000)   
Poverty –1.020   0.207    –0.304   –0.244 *  0.043    0.000   
 (1.536)  (0.379)    (0.304)   (0.132)   (0.163)  (0.00)   
Cost –0.018   –0.024  **  0.020  *  –0.004   0.006    0.000   
 (0.034   (0.012)    (0.012)   (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.000)   
Per capita consumption  –0.018   0.082   –0.091   –0.093 ** 0.002    0.000 * 
 (0.313)  (0.110)    (0.091)   (0.041)   (0.037)  (0.000)   
Percentage of landless  –0.065   0.014   0.120  *  –0.114   0.077  *  0.000 * 
 (0.330)  (0.080)    (0.073)   (0.073)   (0.040)  (0.000)   
Literacy 0.001   –0.000    –0.000  0.000    –0.001   –0.000   
 (0.003)  (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.001)  (0.000)   
Constant 0.916   –0.363    0.568   0.665   –0.018    –0.002  
 (2.171)  (0.715)    (0.572)   (0.269)   (0.233)  (0.001)   
Political Control  Yes    Yes   Yes  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Geographical Fixed Effect Yes    Yes    Yes   Yes    Yes    Yes   
N  206     205     205     207     205     204    
R squared  0.250    0.290     0.329     0.435     0.175    0.678    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   20
significantly related to NGO program location, nor were percentage of population 
landless and per capita consumption. The coefficient on percentage of landless had 
different signs in the different regressions but was never significant. Several robustness 
checks, including different poverty measures and tests for multi-collinearity among the 
indicators of well-being, confirmed these results.
13 Again, these results show that NGOs 
were not targeting poor communities in location decisions (although, of course, they 
might have been focusing on the neediest individuals within those communities). Finally, 
in the Grameen Bank regression there was a positive and significant coefficient on the per 
capita number of government programs, but this coefficient was not significant in the 
other regressions. 
To this point, interpreting the results has been complicated by the need to allow 
for both brand-specific and type-specific effects. Although sample sizes are smaller, the 
data do permit some analysis of location decisions by program type for each brand. Table 
11 presents results for credit programs run by BRAC, Grameen Bank, Proshika, and other 
                                                 
13. The poverty measure used in the regressions was the poverty gap based on the lower poverty line. 
Replacing it with the upper poverty line, the headcount ratio, and Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indices did not 
change the signs or significance of the coefficients. Correlations among the regressors were very low in 
each case except for that between poverty and the logarithm of per capita expenditure. When the 
regressions were estimated by including one indicator at a time and then adding the others sequentially, the 
main results remained robust to all specifications. 
Table 10. Brand specific results 
   GRAMEEN    BRAC     PROSHIKA     CARITAS   
                
PC number of own program in 1995  –0.620  *** –0.783  ***  –1.061  ***  –0.841  *** 
 (0.134)    (0.123)    (0.115)    (0.188)   
PC number of other programs in1995  0.011    0.159    –0.015    –0.036   
 (0.075)    (0.154)    (0.030)    (0.021)   
PC number of government programs  0.122  *** –0.031    0.000    0.047   
 (0.038)    (0.036)    (0.016)    (0.030)   
Poverty –0.429    0.345    –0.360    0.048   
 (0.458)    (0.668)    (0.269)    (0.172)   
Cost –0.011    –0.018    0.001    0.000   
 (0.012)    (0.016)    (0.008)    (0.006)   
Per capita consumption  0.013    0.060    –0.094    –0.036   
 (0.120)    (0.182)    (0.070)    (0.045)   
Percentage of landless  –0.119    0.005    –0.014    –0.011   
 (0.118)    (0.127)    (0.072)    (0.033)   
Literacy 0.001    –0.000    0.002    0.001   
 (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Constant 0.275    –0.094    0.675    0.219   
 (0.789)    (1.157)    (0.473)    (0.289)   
Political Control  Yes    Yes    yes    Yes   
Geographical Fixed Effect  Yes    Yes    yes    No   
N  205     205     197     205    
R squared  0.309     0.304     0.290     0.228    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   21
NGOs. In the regression for BRAC, the coefficient on the number of its own credit 
programs present in 1995 was negative and highly significant coefficient; but the 
coefficient on the number of credit programs run by other NGOs was positive and highly 
significant. This suggests some kind of “pooling” or jamming behavior. If credit 
programs were more likely to be substitutes for each other rather than complements, 
BRAC, in establishing a new program, behaved more like an opportunistic agent. BRAC, 
a well-established organization, was perhaps less in need of building a reputation and 
might indeed have had some incentive to take lower risks by going where credit programs 
already existed. In the regression for other NGOs, the coefficient on the presence of other 
credit programs was negative and significant at the 5 percent level. This is consistent with 
the idea that small NGOs take risks in order to distinguish their development work from 
the work of other NGOs, and that they do this by going to areas that do not already have 
programs. Proshika and Grameen established credit programs where they did not already 
have programs, but were not sensitive to the activities of other NGOs. This was also 
consistent with the opportunistic account. Again, measures of community well-being did 
not appear to influence NGO credit program location decisions. 
Table 12 presents brand-specific results for education and health/family planning 
programs run by BRAC and other NGOs. (Sufficient observations were available only for 
those categories). For BRAC education programs, the coefficient on the per capita 
number of BRAC’s own education programs in 1995 was significant and negative, the 
coefficient on the presence of education programs run by other NGOs was not significant, 
the coefficients on community well being and literacy were not significant, and the 
coefficient on the cost variable was negative and highly significant. With the exception of 
Table 11. Results for credit program run by different NGOs 
   Credit       
 BRAC   GRAMEEN   PROSHIKA    SMALL  
               
PC number own type and brand  –1.176  *** –1.038  *** –1.019  ***  –1.263  ***
 (0.171)    (0.376)    (0.353)    (0.348)   
PC number same type but other brand  0.371  *** –0.828    –0.026    –0.309  ** 
 (0.151)    (0.845)    (0.047)    (0.148)   
Poverty 0.001    –0.004    –0.000    –0.002  * 
 (0.001)    (0.004)    (0.000)    (0.001)   
Cost 0.000    –0.000    0.000    0.0000   
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.0000)   
Per capita consumption  0.001    –0.000    0.000    –0.0003   
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.0003)   
Percentage of landless  0.000    –0.001    0.000    –0.0001   
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.0003)   
Constant –0.001    0.003    0.000    0.0029   
  (0.001)    (0.003)    (0.000)    (0.0022)   
Political  Control  Yes   Yes  Yes   yes   
Geographical Fixed Effect  Yes     Yes     Yes     yes   
Observations  207     207     207     209    
R-squared 0.293     0.064     0.160     0.236    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  22
the cost variable, the regression for BRAC health and family planning programs 
presented similar results. These findings were consistent with the opportunistic account. 
In the regressions for education and health/family planning programs run by other NGOs, 
the coefficients on the per capita number of same type programs run by “other” NGOs 
were negative and significant, as expected under both the opportunistic and benevolent 
accounts. The coefficient for the per capita number of other education programs run by a 
different NGO (that is, by Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika, or Caritas) was positive and 
significant at 10 percent, which is not consistent with the opportunistic account; but for 
health and family planning programs, that coefficient was significant and negative, which 
is consistent with the opportunistic account. The indicators of need had no bearing on 
location decisions. Overall, these findings provide support for the hypothesis that NGOs 
distinguish between the existence of their own types of programs and those of other 
NGOs when making location decisions; and that they do not focus on community-level 
poverty.  
6. Conclusions   
Economic theory has a simple, coherent account of firm behavior (profit 
maximization), and public choice theory and institutional economics have described a 
coherent, if more contested, set of stories regarding decisionmaking and resource 
allocation in the public sector. An account of the behavior of non-profit organizations, 
such as development NGOs, however, remains underdeveloped, largely because there 
have been few empirical tests of the range of objective functions that theory has offered 
Table 12. Results for education and health/family planning programs run by different NGOs
   Education     Health/Family Planning 
 BRAC    SMALL     BRAC   SMALL   
PC number own type and brand  –0.828  ***  –0.994  ***    –0.832  ***  –1.035  *** 
 (0.111)    (0.060)      (0.193)    (0.124)   
PC number same type but other brand  0.027    0.297  *    0.141    –0.094  * 
 (0.157)    (0.172)      (0.182)    (0.049)   
Poverty 0.000    0.000      0.000    –0.001   
 (0.001)    (0.000)      (0.000)    (0.000)   
Cost –0.000  ***  0.000      0.0000    0.000   
 (0.000)    (0.000)      (0.0000)    (0.000)   
Per capita consumption  0.000    0.000      0.000    0.000   
 (0.000)    (0.000)      (0.000)    (0.000)   
Percentage of landless  –0.000    0.000      0.000    0.000   
 (0.000)    (0.000)      (0.000)    (0.000)   
Literacy 0.000    0.000  ***    0.000    0.000   
 (0.000)    (0.000)      (0.000)    (0.000)   
Constant –0.000    0.000      –0.000    0.000   
  (0.001)    (0.000)      (0.000)    (0.000)   
Political Control  yes    yes      Yes    Yes   
Geographical Fixed Effect  yes     yes        Yes     Yes    
Observations  207     229        229     229    
R-squared 0.381     0.311        0.286     0.230    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   23
for them. This paper is an attempt to investigate the determinants of NGOs location in 
Bangladesh using household and community level data. Two crucial elements that have 
to be accounted for when studying NGO behavior are reliance on donor funding and the 
existence of other NGO programs in the same location.  
The analysis does not find strong support for the claim that NGOs were targeting 
poverty. In fact, in most regressions the coefficients on indicators of need (poverty gap, 
literacy, percentage of landless) were not significant. This is not to suggest that 
beneficence plays no role in NGO activities. There are countless individuals in 
Bangladesh, as in other countries, for whom volunteerism and personal sacrifice, a 
special concern for the poor irrespective of where programs are located, and the appeal of 
a higher calling are why they work in NGOs. Those values are also important, however, 
to many outside the sector, including many in Bangladeshi government. The point being 
made here is that NGOs, as organizations, are not so permeated with altruism that it is 
apparent in their location decisions. It is possible, of course, that the targeting of human 
needs other than poverty, such as social exclusion, guides their location choices; and 
those cannot be easily captured. The findings also, of course, do not rule out the 
possibility that despite the absence of targeting at the community level, there was 
targeting taking place within the community, although evidence from other studies 
suggests that NGOs might not be targeting the “ultra-poor” (Amin, Rai, and Topa 2002; 
Rahman and Razzaque 2000) 
A striking result in the analysis is the fact that the presence of a program in a 
community had a strong negative effect on the flow of programs of the same type or run 
by the same NGO. In fact, in all of the regressions the coefficient on the per capita 
number of NGO present in the community had a negative and highly significant effect on 
the change in the number of that same program. This result cannot be explained simply 
by decreasing returns to NGO programs of the same kind. If that were the case, one 
would expect that the effect of an NGOs’ own programs would be equal to the effect of 
comparable programs run by other NGOs. And that should also be true in the regressions 
for NGO brand, where the substitutability argument was weaker; but that turned out not 
to be the case. The presence of credit programs run by other NGOs had a positive effect 
on the decision to locate a credit program in that same location. The same result held in 
the case of education programs run by other NGOs. The findings suggest that contracts 
with donors, implicit or explicit, probably play a crucial role in determining the 
incentives that affect NGO location choices.  
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